

Kai Li and Chi-Yang Tsou

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MFA 2020

The Paper in a Nutshell

My Comments

Final Remarks

Outline

The Paper in a Nutshell

My Comments

Durable Asset = Hard to Finance

• Non-durable Asset:
$$V_{nd} = \frac{CF_1}{(1+dr)} + \frac{CF_2}{(1+dr)^2} + \frac{CF_3}{(1+dr)^3} \dots$$

$$= \frac{K_{nd} + m}{(1+dr)} + \frac{0}{(1+dr)^2} + \frac{0}{(1+dr)^3} \dots$$

• Durable Asset:

$$V_{d} = \frac{CF_{1}}{(1+dr)} + \frac{CF_{2}}{(1+dr)^{2}} + \frac{CF_{3}}{(1+dr)^{3}} \dots$$
$$= \frac{K_{d} \times \pi}{(1+dr)} + \frac{K_{d} \times \pi}{(1+dr)^{2}} + \frac{0}{(1+dr)^{3}} \dots$$
$$\frac{V_{d}}{K_{d}} = \pi \times \left[\frac{1}{(1+dr)} + \frac{1}{(1+dr)^{2}}\right]$$

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• Durable Assets = Hard to Finance (they are "expensive")

- Financially constrained firms prefer "cheaper" capital
- During recession, firms become more financially constrained
- During recession, V_d falls relative to V_{nd}
- V_d is riskier than $V_{nd} \implies$ Asset Durability Premium

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| L 2 | 3 | 4 | Н | H-L |
|-----|---|---|---|-----|
|-----|---|---|---|-----|

| | \mathbf{L} | 2 | 3 | 4 | Η | H-L |
|---|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------|
| | | | \mathbf{D} | [V | | |
| $ \begin{array}{c} E[R]-R_{f} (\%) \\ [t] \end{array} $ | $5.39 \\ 1.48$ | $9.57 \\ 2.81$ | $9.34 \\ 2.81$ | $9.03 \\ 2.92$ | $12.32 \\ 3.62$ | 6.93 2.86 |

| | \mathbf{L} | 2 | 3 | 4 | Η | H-L | | |
|----------------|--------------|------|------|------|-------|------|--|--|
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| [t] | 1.48 | 2.81 | 2.81 | 2.92 | 3.62 | 2.86 | | |
| | WW Index | | | | | | | |
| $E[R]-R_f$ (%) | 6.09 | 8.24 | 9.13 | 9.59 | 9.65 | 3.56 | | |
| [t] | 2.13 | 2.78 | 3.68 | 3.78 | 3.85 | 2.23 | | |

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| Panel B: Whole Sample | | | | | | | | |
| $E[R]-R_f$ (%) | 7.36 | 8.10 | 8.12 | 8.65 | 8.79 | 1.44 | | |
| [t] | 2.70 | 3.49 | 3.26 | 4.17 | 3.55 | 1.03 | | |

The Risk Mechanism

Table 7: Aggregate Shocks and Price Dynamics

| | (1) | (2) |
|--------------|-------|-------|
| dy | 1.51 | 1.02 |
| [t] | 11.71 | 3.89 |
| Interaction | | 1.06 |
| [t] | | 3.28 |
| Observations | 4,830 | 4,760 |
| Asset FE | Yes | Yes |
| Cluster SE | Yes | Yes |

 $\Delta q_{h,t} = \beta_y \; \Delta y_t + \beta_d \; Asset \; Durability_{h,t} \times \Delta y_t + \varepsilon_{h,t}$

The Risk Mechanism

| | \mathbf{L} | 2 | 3 | 4 | н | H-L |
|-----|--------------|------|-------|-------|------|------|
| TFP | 1.16 | 1.29 | 1.63 | 1.58 | 1.78 | 0.62 |
| [t] | 14.95 | 8.88 | 17.82 | 10.30 | 9.06 | 4.25 |
| GDP | 1.33 | 2.01 | 2.10 | 2.08 | 2.54 | 1.21 |
| [t] | 3.76 | 5.79 | 4.49 | 4.72 | 4.60 | 5.59 |

Table 10: Cash Flow Sensitivity

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| $\Delta q_{h,t} = \beta_y \ \Delta y_t + \beta_d \ Asset \ Durability_{h,t} \times \Delta y_t + \varepsilon_h$ |
|--|
|--|

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|------------------|------------|--------------|------------|-------|------|----------------|----|----------------|---------------------|
|------------------|------------|--------------|------------|-------|------|----------------|----|----------------|---------------------|

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| Observations Asset FE Cluster SE | 4,830 Yes Yes | 4,760 Yes Yes |

Table 11: Estimating the Market Price of Risk

| Panel A: Portfolio Risk Exposures | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|----------|------|------|------|------|--|--|--|
| | \mathbf{L} | 2 | 3 | 4 | н | H-L | | | |
| TFP | 0.36 | 1.92 | 1.37 | 1.48 | 2.33 | 1.89 | | | |
| [t] | 0.75 | 1.93 | 1.34 | 1.73 | 2.16 | 2.15 | | | |
| GDP | -0.09 | 2.97 | 1.63 | 1.48 | 3.32 | 3.37 | | | |
| [t] | -0.03 | 0.83 | 0.51 | 0.37 | 0.75 | 1.85 | | | |

• A representative household solves:

$$U_{t} = \max_{\{C_{t}, B_{i,t}\}} \left\{ (1-\beta) \cdot C_{t}^{1-1/\psi} + \beta \cdot \left(\mathbb{E}_{t} \left[U_{t+1}^{1-\gamma} \right] \right)^{\frac{1-1/\psi}{1-\gamma}} \right\}^{\frac{1}{1-1/\psi}}$$

s.t.

$$C_t + \int B_{i,t} di = W_t \cdot L_t + R_{f,t} \cdot \int B_{i,t-1} di + \int \prod_{i,t} di$$

Entrepreneur i solves:

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$$V_{t}^{i} = \underset{\{K_{i,t+1}^{d}, K_{i,t+1}^{nd}, N_{i,t+1}, B_{i,t}\}}{\mathsf{Max}} \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[M_{t+1} \cdot \left\{ \lambda \cdot N_{i,t+1} + (1-\lambda) \cdot V_{t+1}^{i}(N_{i,t+1}) \right\} \right]$$

s.t.

 $q_{d,t} \cdot K_{i,t+1}^d + q_{nd,t} \cdot K_{i,t+1}^{nd} = N_{i,t} + B_{i,t} \qquad (with \ \delta_d < \delta_{nd})$

$$|B_{i,t}| \leq |\theta \cdot \sum_{h \in \{d,nd\}} q_{h,t} \cdot K^h_{i,t+1}|$$

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$$\begin{aligned} q_{d,t} \cdot K_{i,t+1}^{d} + q_{nd,t} \cdot K_{i,t+1}^{nd} &= N_{i,t} + B_{i,t} \qquad (\text{with } \delta_d < \delta_{nd}) \\ B_{i,t} &\leq \theta \cdot \sum_{h \in \{d,nd\}} q_{h,t} \cdot K_{i,t+1}^h \end{aligned}$$

 Table 6: Asset Durability Spread, Data, and Model Comparison

| Variables | \mathbf{L} | 2 | 3 | 4 | н | H-L | |
|--------------------|----------------|----------|-------|-------|-------|------|--|
| | Panel A: Data | | | | | | |
| Asset Durability | 7.69 | 9.99 | 11.45 | 14.24 | 18.00 | | |
| Depreciation | 0.19 | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.13 | 0.11 | | |
| Book Lev. | 0.13 | 0.19 | 0.21 | 0.28 | 0.32 | | |
| ROE | 0.12 | 0.17 | 0.18 | 0.22 | 0.23 | | |
| $E[R]$ - R_f (%) | 5.39 | 9.57 | 9.34 | 9.03 | 12.32 | 6.93 | |
| | Panel B: Model | | | | | | |
| Asset Durability | 8.33 | 10.05 | 11.12 | 14.28 | 20.08 | | |
| Depreciation | 0.12 | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.05 | | |
| Book Lev. | 0.19 | 0.27 | 0.33 | 0.39 | 0.45 | | |
| ROE | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.13 | | |
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• Equilibrium $q_{d,t}$ and $q_{nd,t} \Rightarrow$ Asset Durability Premium

- Equilibrium q_{d,t} and q_{nd,t} depend on constrained firms, but they should affect all firms (constrained and unconstrained)
- Empirically, the Asset Durability Premium exists only among constrained firms
- Can you add unconstrained firms to the model and show that such firms do not display the Asset Durability Premium (and explore the mechanism)?

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- $B_{i,t} \leq \theta \cdot \sum_{h \in \{d,nd\}} q_{h,t} \cdot K_{i,t+1}^h$
- θ should be higher for durable assets
- It matters: Ai et al. (2019) indicates higher collateralizability lowers the riskiness of assets
- Page 6 states "...we also consider a variation of the model with Rampini (2019) type of collateral constraint", but I could not identify the results related to this analysis
- I suggest jointly studying durability and collateralizability in a model with (δ_d, θ_d) and $(\delta_{nd}, \theta_{nd})$ firms
- You can compare double sorts in the data (likely to show stronger durability premium) with double sorts in the model

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- The durability premium arises because of high q_{d,t}, which makes durable capital "expensive", and thus hard to finance
- Does that imply the model generates a Growth Premium (as opposed to a Value Premium)?
- It is not clear because "durable firms" are quite profitable (and thus have short equity duration) in the model
- I suggest you explore this issue explicitly in the paper
- Jointly studying the durability and collateralizability premia may also shed light on this matter

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The Paper in a Nutshell

My Comments

Final Remarks

Outline

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