

Equity Duration and Predictability

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EFA 2020

The Paper in a Nutshell

My Comments

Final Remarks

Outline

The Paper in a Nutshell

My Comments

Final Remarks

\uparrow Dividend Maturity \Rightarrow \uparrow % of Var(dp) Explained by μ

• 1-Year Dividend Strip:

$$P^{(1)} = D_1 \cdot e^{-\mu_1}$$

$$= D_1 \cdot e^{-\mu_1}$$

$$\downarrow$$

$$\downarrow$$

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• 2-Year Dividend Strip:

 $P^{(2)} = D_2 \cdot e^{-(\mu_1 + \mu_2)}$ = D \cdot e^{(a_1 + a_2) - (a_1 + a_2)} + $dp^{(2)} = (\mu_1 + \mu_2) - (g_1 + g_2)$

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• 1-Year Dividend Strip:



• 2-Year Dividend Strip:

$$P^{(2)} = D_2 \cdot e^{-(\mu_1 + \mu_2)}$$

= $D \cdot e^{(g_1 + g_2) - (\mu_1 + \mu_2)}$
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\uparrow Dividend Maturity \Rightarrow \uparrow % of Var(dp) Explained by μ

• 1-Year Dividend Strip:

$$P^{(1)} = D_1 \cdot e^{-\mu_1}$$
$$= D \cdot e^{g_1 - \mu_1}$$
$$\Downarrow$$
$$dp^{(1)} = \mu_1 - g_1$$

• 2-Year Dividend Strip:

$$P^{(2)} = D_2 \cdot e^{-(\mu_1 + \mu_2)}$$

= $D \cdot e^{(g_1 + g_2) - (\mu_1 + \mu_2)}$
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$$dp^{(2)} = (\mu_1 + \mu_2) - (g_1 + g_2)$$

\uparrow Equity Duration \Rightarrow \uparrow % of Var(dp) Explained by μ

• AR(1) processes for μ and g (ignoring constants):

• Then, the dividend price ratio is (ignoring constants):

• And Gonçalves (2020a) shows that $Dur~pprox~1+e^{-dp}~=~rac{1}{1-a}$

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$$\mu_{t+1} = \delta_{\mu} \cdot \mu_t + \epsilon_{t+1}^{\mu}$$
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$$dp_{t} = \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[\sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^{j-1} r_{t+j} \right] - \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[\sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^{j-1} \Delta d_{t+j} \right]$$
$$= \left(\frac{1}{1 - \rho \cdot \delta_{t}} \right) \mu_{t} + \left(\frac{1}{1 - \rho \cdot \delta_{t}} \right) \cdot \beta_{t}$$

- $\circ~$ If $\rho=$ 0, persistence does not matter
- $\circ~$ If ho=1, persistence matters a lot

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 $r_{t+1} = \beta_r \cdot dp_t + \epsilon_{t+1}^r$

 $\Delta d_{t+1} = \beta_d \cdot dp_t + \epsilon^d_{t+1} \quad \Rightarrow$

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	Market	Dividend strips
	(1)	(2)
ER	0.98	0.73
ER (implied)	0.97	0.63
EDG	0.03	0.37
EDG (implied)	0.02	0.27

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	1629-1945	1945-2017
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	Below 0.5	Above 0.5
	(5)	(6)
ER	0.93	0.60
ER (implied)	0.88	0.55
EDG	0.12	0.45
EDG (implied)	0.07	0.40

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- Data: DP decreases from 3.4% (ho=0.97) to 4.9% (ho=0.95)
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Table 7: Simulations

Payout (%)	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
DP (%)	2.81	3.75	4.70	5.67	6.65	7.64	8.65	9.70
ρ	0.97	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.94	0.93	0.92	0.91
ER	0.94	0.91	0.87	0.84	0.80	0.77	0.74	0.72
EDG	0.05	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.18	0.21	0.23	0.25
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It is not about ρ ...it is about σ_{μ}/σ_{g} $dp_{t} = \left(\frac{1}{1-\rho\cdot\delta_{\mu}}\right)\cdot\mu_{t} + \left(\frac{1}{1-\rho\cdot\delta_{g}}\right)\cdot g_{t}$ $= \left(\frac{1}{1-\rho\cdot\delta_{g}}\right)\cdot\left(\beta_{t}-dp\right) + \left(\frac{1}{1-\rho\cdot\delta_{g}}\right)\cdot\left(\beta_{t}-dp\right)$

- In the empirical analysis, ρ has no effect because the persistences are the same (= β_{dp})
- The effect comes from:

In fact, since Cor(µ, dp) = Cor(g, dp), the effect comes from:

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 $Cov(\mu, dp) = \beta_r \cdot Var(dp)$ vs $Cov(g, dp) = \beta_d \cdot Var(dp)$

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 vs $Cov(g, dp) = \beta_d \cdot Var(dp)$

• In fact, since $Cor(\mu, dp) = Cor(g, dp)$, the effect comes from:

$$\sigma_{\mu} = \beta_{r} \cdot \sigma_{dp}$$
 vs $\sigma_{g} = \beta_{d} \cdot \sigma_{dp}$

- No! It may still be about duration (and I think it largely is)
- Gormsen (2020) shows that $\sigma(\mu_{DivStrip}) < \sigma(\mu_{Equity})$
- Gonçalves (2020b) shows how to think about $\sigma(\mu_{DivStrip}) < \sigma(\mu_{Equity})$ from an ICAPM perspective:

$$-\gamma_t \cdot \tilde{r}_{w,t+1} - (\gamma_t - 1) \cdot \tilde{v} \tilde{w}_{t+1}$$
$$-\gamma_t \cdot \tilde{r}_{w,t+1} - \lambda' \tilde{s}_{t+1}$$

- Duration endogenously determines market eta
- \uparrow Dur \Rightarrow \uparrow β_w \Rightarrow \uparrow σ_μ \Rightarrow \uparrow More of σ_{dp} is driven by μ
- Section 2 (i.e., the motivation) should argue that the duration effect can happen through σ_{μ} (not only through ρ)

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EDG (implied)	0.02	0.27

Gormsen (2020) shows that σ(μ_{DivStrip}) < σ(μ_{Equity})

• Gonçalves (2020b) shows how to think about $\sigma(\mu_{DivStrip}) < \sigma(\mu_{Equity})$ from an ICAPM perspective:

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- The empirical analysis uses $\delta_{\mu}=\delta_{g}=eta_{dp}$ and ${\it Cor}(\mu,g)=1$

• As such,
$$\sigma_{\mu}^{LT} = \frac{1}{1 - \rho \cdot \beta_{dp}} \cdot \sigma_{\mu}$$
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Parameters	<i>t <</i> 1045	<i>t</i> > 1945				
	$l \ge 1945$	All	ρ	σ	δ	$\sigma \& \delta$
$\sigma_{\mu}^{ extsf{LT}}/\sigma_{g}^{ extsf{LT}}$	0.72					
\mathbf{ER}	29.2%					
EDG	70.8%					

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	t <u><</u> 1945	All	ρ	σ	δ	$\sigma \& \delta$
$\sigma_{\mu}^{ extsf{LT}}/\sigma_{g}^{ extsf{LT}}$	0.72	6.38				
\mathbf{ER}	29.2%	98.1%				
EDG	70.8%	1.9%				

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Parameters	<i>t <</i> 1045		<i>t</i> > 1945				
i arameters	t <u>~</u> 1945	All	ρ	σ	δ	$\sigma \& \delta$	
$\sigma_{\mu}^{ extsf{LT}}/\sigma_{g}^{ extsf{LT}}$	0.72	6.38	0.79				
\mathbf{ER}	29.2%	98.1%	34.4%				
EDG	70.8%	1.9%	65.6%				

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Parameters	+ < 1015	t > 1945				
i arameters	t <u>~</u> 1945	All	ρ	σ	δ	$\sigma \& \delta$
$\sigma_{\mu}^{ extsf{LT}}/\sigma_{g}^{ extsf{LT}}$	0.72	6.38	0.79	4.26		
\mathbf{ER}	29.2%	98.1%	34.4%	99.6%		
EDG	70.8%	1.9%	65.6%	0.4%		

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Parameters	<i>t <</i> 10/15	t > 1945				
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$\sigma_{\mu}^{ extsf{LT}}/\sigma_{g}^{ extsf{LT}}$	0.72	6.38	0.79	4.26	0.96	
\mathbf{ER}	29.2%	98.1%	34.4%	99.6%	47.0%	
EDG	70.8%	1.9%	65.6%	0.4%	53.0%	

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$\sigma_{\mu}^{ extsf{LT}}/\sigma_{g}^{ extsf{LT}}$	0.72	6.38	0.79	4.26	0.96	5.64	
\mathbf{ER}	29.2%	98.1%	34.4%	99.6%	47.0%	100.7%	
EDG	70.8%	1.9%	65.6%	0.4%	53.0%	-0.7%	

The Paper in a Nutshell

My Comments

Final Remarks

Outline

The Paper in a Nutshell

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Final Remarks

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- I recommend reading the paper and I expect it to publish well
- It would be useful to:



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Duration matters to understand the sources of price variation!

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- Start from a completely different motivation for why duration matters when decomposing returns (because it affects $\sigma_{\mu}/\sigma_{g}!$)
- Link the results to some economic framework that demonstrates the connection between duration and σ_{μ}/σ_{g}
- Good luck!

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