

How Integrated are Corporate Bond and Stock Markets?

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Outline

The Paper

My Comments

Final Remarks

- No-arbitrage $\Rightarrow \mathbb{E}[M_t \cdot R_t] = 1$ with $M_t = a + b^{'}R_t$
- Market integration implies:

• Insight: test for market Integration empirically with

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Without Frictions

	Credit Rating	Duration	Size	Value	Leverage	Momentum	Asset Growth	Profitability	Liquidity	Short Interest
$\mathbb{E}[M_B R_S] - 1$	9 (0.042)	16 (0.051)	-14 (-0.063)	-8 (-0.027)	$25 \\ (0.087)$	-9 (-0.059)	$10 \\ (0.051)$	4 (0.023)	13 (0.028)	18 (0.046)
$\mathbb{E}[M_S R_B] - 1$	-40 (-0.409)	-55 (-0.854)	-30 (-0.181)	-51 (-0.287)	-71 (-0.253)	-73 (-0.406)	-26 (-0.215)	-56 (-0.319)	-27 (-0.204)	-55 (-0.170)

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- Intuition: segmentation α is comparable to E[R_E] − E[R_B] spread, which is not much different from typical trading cost
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- Identification Challenge: Segmentation vs Trading Costs
- Issue: trading anomalies is costly
- Cost mitigating strategies
 - Novy-Marx and Velikov (2016, 2019)
 - Only change portfolios after some rules are satisfied
 - This will reduce trading costs
 - Will the cross-market α s reduce accordingly?
- Cross-section of strategy turnover
 - Calculate strategy turnover
 - Low turnover strategies have lower trading costs
 - Example: Equity Duration (Gonçalves (2021))
 - Do cross-market α s vary with strategy turnover?

Miscellaneous Comments

- Link to Intermediary-based Asset Pricing
 - Constrained SDFs reflect their respective overall markets (Figure 6)
 - So, link between SDFs and intermediary capital risk factor is hard to interpret
 - I would drop that part of the analysis
- With weak factors (Giglio, Xiu, and Zhang (2021)), results can suggest segmentation when none is present (risk factors just differ across asset classes). Does not matter for your findings, but makes it hard to generalize the method.
- Small notation issue: $M_t = a + b' R_t$ can only be written as $M_t = \omega' R_t$ if you include in R_t a risk-free payoff

Outline

The Paper

My Comments

Final Remarks



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